Introduction

40
Tragedy of the commons as well as Elinor Ostrom's work on non-tragedy of the 41 commons have been applied to environmental issues extensively. Given the evidence for the rely on a network of informal regulations and unwritten rules to bring order to the short but 117 frantic fishing season in late spring/early summer. Knudsen (2008) found that it is the "ethical 118 know-how" of fishing based on mutual respect and unspoken rules of courtesy amongst the 119 fisherman of the community that allows the small-boat industry to thrive from generation to 120 generation while also adapting to the changing ecological landscape of the Black Sea coast.
121
Knudsen's analysis shows how artisanal and local fishers have had to adapt to the changing 122 biological makeup of the Black Sea, and how their economic livelihood is directly related to the 123 amount of fish available to them.
124
Maximum Sustainable Yield
125
While individual agents act and adapt to the conditions, the means of fishing, such as 126 blast fishing, bottom trawling and bycatch, lead to overfishing that adversely affect the future 127 biomass (see Reeves Reeves and Notarbartolo di Sciara, 2006; Gerlak, 2004) . The concept of
128
MSY is an estimate of an optimum fish catch each year that both maximizes current fish yield 129 but also leaves enough of the biomass still unexploited in the sea to continue the yield in future.
130
A function that can accurately model the maximum sustainable that yield obtainable by all 131 fishing parties is given by Knowler et al. ( 2001) .
132
Q t+1 = σ * S t [1] 7
Here, Q t+1 is the total exploitable fish population available in the next year, σ is the natural 135 survival rate of fish in the environment and S t is the population that survives the year's harvest.
136
S t can be expressed as
137
S t = Q t -h( Q t , E t ) [2] 138 where Q t is the total population of fish at time t and h is a function of fish catch, which is a 139 function of both Q, and E, the fishing effort exerted over the year.
140
Various methods of estimating a value for the amount of fish which can be harvested 141 each year to maintain MSY have been proposed (Die and Caddy, 1997; Garcia et al., 1989) .
142
This estimator is an important component of an effective fisheries management structure for 143 several reasons. First of all, many countries with fishing economies are considered "developing"
144
and may not be able to afford regular, formal assessments of fish stock that occur in more 145 developed countries (Die and Caddy, 1997 which NE are ESS, they must meet one of two conditions presented below. Let A be the payoff 176 of a strategy, let there be two strategies i and j, and let * denote Nash strategy. Then
Condition 1 indicates that the payoff of both players using the NE strategy is greater than the 181 payoff of one player using a NE strategy and the other player using any other strategy.
183
Condition 2: Ai*j > Ajj
Condition 2 indicates that the payoff of one player using the NE strategy and another player 186 using any other strategy is greater than the payoff of both players using strategies that are not the 187 NE strategy (Barron, 2008 is the mixed strategy. The values in equations 5 to 7 are probabilities.
11
Nash Equilibria:
Testing these three NE for ESS, we find that condition 1 is met for only the pure NE strategies
230
(of players both cooperating and both not cooperating) iv but not for the mixed strategy. In other 231 words, in an environment with many fishers playing similar games, both fishers will tend to 232 follow the pure strategies of either cooperation or non-cooperation with guidelines. Which NE The analysis of the ESS indicates that it would take a significant portion of the fishers to pure NE where the players will either both choose to cooperate or both choose to not cooperate.
262
However, only one ESS strategy may be eventually adopted by all fishers over multiple games 263 among multiple fishers. Nash Equilibria:
Testing for ESS, we find the payoff of the two strategies that are not the NE are higher than the 270 payoff of one player using the NE strategy and the other player using any other strategy. which players are given an endowment and make the choice to contribute money for a collective 287 good, the standard game theory model indicates that no players will contribute to the collective 288 good, as there is no individual incentive for them to do so (Ostrom, 2000) . This is similar to the (Ostrom, 2000) . If these experimental observations are extended to the case of fishers in the
297
Black Sea, then it is possible that individuals will be more likely to cooperate with one another 298 successfully, such as in the Carsibasi case in Turkey.
299
To determine whether players can cooperate, it is important to explain why they are not 300 following the NE strategy, even though it would appear to be in their self-interest to do so.
301
Ostrom (2000) explains these results by differentiating between three types of players. "Rational dilemma from occurring (Ostrom, 2000) . The presence of these types of players in the 312 population of fishers would increase the potential for cooperation.
313
A variety of contextual factors are important to whether individuals will be able to form 314 social norms to cooperate and govern a common resource effectively. One important factor is 15 whether the use of the resource can be monitored (Dietz et al., 2002) . While observing the total 316 amount of fish in the sea is not a feasible possibility, local fishermen may be able to monitor the 317 people who are fishing in the sea (Acheson, 1975) . Another important factor is whether the 318 economic system is in a state of rapid transition, since a stable system of social norms may be 319 unable to develop (Dietz et al., 2002 them much less likely to cooperate after these incentives were removed (Ostrom, 2000) .
347
Evidence indicates that directly regulating fisheries would potentially crowd out social norms 348 and would not be an effective solution to overexploitation.
349
The better government policy would be to support social norms on a local level that strategies and the outcome of non-cooperation is not socially desirable.
377
Some scholars have argued that rational players should always choose the payoff 378 dominant strategy because they expect to maximize their gains and they expect the other player 379 to do so as well. This argument relies on the idea that players will be able to make decisions based on a "collective rationality" where "rational individuals will cooperate in pursuing their 381 common interests if the conditions permit them to do so" (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, p. 359) .
382
However, other scholars reject this viewpoint and argue that risk-averse players will choose to 18 play the risk dominant strategy to avoid the possibility of a loss. They argue that it is not 384 possible for players to form together as one group that makes collectively rational decisions.
385
Because players will not successfully cooperate and make decisions together, they make 386 individually rational decisions in which they do not cooperate with one another, and are likely to 387 choose the risk dominant equilibrium (Straub, 1996) v . regarding financial risk taking in the United States (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998) , and in 404 making consumer decisions and lifestyle choices (Hersch, 1996 where n is the number of possible outcomes, p k is the probability of outcome k, and U k is the 428 utility of outcome k. This model assumes that people will be consistently either risk-seeking 429 (r>1) or averse (r<1) depending on the parameter r (Harrison and Rutström, 2008) .
430
While EUT may make sense in many situations, evidence from psychology indicates 431 that people often act in ways that do not match the model. One major problem with the theory is 432 that people's risk preferences are not consistent, and can vary between being risk-averse and 433 risk-seeking depending on the situation (Rabin and Thaler, 2001 where n is the number of possible outcomes, w(p) k is the weighted probability of outcome k, and 457 U k is the utility of outcome k (Harrison and Rutström, 2008 ii For more information on the pollution control aspects and three protocols, see http://www.blacksea-commission.org/.
iii We are not suggesting perpetual subsidies on fishing which are subject to potential abuse and asymmetric corruption. This is a one-time subsidy for this particular example. Past observations show that successful subsidies which achieve real outcomes are set for a short and limited time period and are not extended regardless of pressure and of bargaining.
iv Calculations are not reported here for parsimony and are available on request.
v The players' choice between choosing either a payoff or risk dominant strategy reflects a choice between two different methods with which each player can maximize their payoffs. By choosing a payoff dominant strategy, the player chooses a maximax strategy, in which he seeks to gain the maximum possible outcome. By choosing a risk dominant strategy, the player chooses a maximin strategy, in which he seeks to maximize the smallest possible gain he can receive with certainty (Pearman, 1977) . The choice between either a maximin or a maximax strategy indicates two different ways players may choose to make decisions, depending on how much they prefer certainty over risk.
vi An experimental study conducted by Schmidt, et al. (2003) tested players to find that players generally responded to changes in the risk dominant strategy, and did not respond to changes in the payoff dominant strategy. The authors argue that this study indicates that risk dominant strategies are important in determining whether players will be able to cooperate, and, while payoff dominant strategies are also important, they seem to have less of an effect (Schmidt et al., 2003) . A study by Straub found that when players play repeated games, they tended to converge away from the payoff dominant strategy and toward the risk dominant strategy (Straub, 1996) . Together, these studies indicate that players tend to be risk-averse and thus are less likely to cooperate to gain a higher payoff. 
